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CHAPTER ONE
OVERVIEW
The Montana Army National Guard (MT ARNG) has recently
undergone a major reorganization of its structure, person
nel and equipment resource base, and assigned wartime
mission.

The most fundamental change is the wartime

mission.

The MT ARNG is now structured primarily as a

frontline combat force, designated as the 163d Armored
Brigade (163d AR BDE).

This status has necessitated a

complete acquisition and deployment of new and upgraded
weapons systems and the concurrent training needed to
insure soldier proficiency in the corresponding military
occupational specialties.

Approximately 900 newly author

ized positions have accompanied the reorganization, which
has increased the authorized troop strength of the
ARNG to 3,813 soldiers.

MT

(See Appendix A for the MT ARNG

organizational structure.)
While the reorganization into an Armored Brigade
structure carries with it the equipment, training and
personnel needs as identified above, there is a basic and
compelling change which must be understood and emphasized
The 163d AR BDE is now designated as frontline.

If or

when a conflict occurs which, in accordance which existing
"war plans", requires the Federal activation of the 163d
AR BDE, it will be deployed not only to the location of
the conflict, but in all likelihood, into the very heart
of the hostilities.
The 163d AR BDE is a self-sufficient, frontline combat
force.

Its assets include organic medical, maintenance,

engineer, transportation, administrative and food service
resources which support the combat elements consisting of
artillery, mechanized infantry (with armored personnel
carriers) and armor (tanks).

The primary weapon system is

the Ml Abrams main battle tank, with 116 of them author
ized between the two cavalry (CAV) battalions (see
Appendix A ) .
The wartime mission and existence of the 163d AR BDE is
based upon the application of armor technology and
tactics.

Classified military war plans position the 163d

in historically one of the most volatile areas of Eurasia
with a placement time sequence which will maximize deadly
confrontation.

This is particularly sobering since the

163d AR BDE is a Reserve Component force.

The soldiers do

not prepare for this level of intensity of conflict on a
full-time basis as does the Active Component, nor are the
resources available to the MT ARNG units as they are to
their active duty counterparts.

Yet the 163d AR BDE will

ultimately be assigned to the "front", where the combat is

most Intense and casualties the highest.
The MT ARNG command structure has a most critical and
ominous responsibility.

That responsibility is to

optimally prepare soldiers for conflict on the 21st
Century's version of a battlefield.

Strategy and

execution of combat plans and initiatives are dependent
upon an incredibly complex integration of air and ground
forces.

The "state-of-the-art" technology in weapons,

communication and information systems is ever more
dependent upon the capabilities of the human resource,
whose survival is determined by far too many circumstances
beyond the individual soldier's control.
The optimal preparation of soldiers for combat can be
boiled down into the fundamental concept of "training".
Soldiers and entire organizations must be trained in the
usage of their equipment and in performing tactical
operations in a combat and noncombat context.

For Army

National Guard units, this is typically accomplished
during a weekend "drill" called Inactive Duty Training
(IDT), held once a month.

Once a year, usually for a

two-week period called Annual Training, this training on
equipment and tactics is integrated at a training site
where the unit applies its cumulative year of training
into actual operations in a field environment.

It is

readily discernible that MT ARNG unit training is severely

hampered by time restrictions.

One weekend a month and

two additional weeks per year do not allow much time to
train for the combat scenario previously described.
Although it may be desirable that more time be available
to the MT ARNG for training activities, considering the
demands of the combat environment, there is little
latitude for change from the current system.

Drilling one

weekend a month is acceptable to most employers and
families, however, any more than that may not be so
acceptable.

This leaves only the Annual Training period

with viable potential for training enhancement.

Policies

exist whereby armor units can conceivably increase the
length of Annual Training from two to three weeks.
However, soldiers* employment, education and/or family
commitments are not conducive for such an extension.
Since any alteration of the time available is not
practical, other options must be considered.

A viable and

realistic option is to change where the Annual Training
would be held.

There are training sites that may be more

conducive to maximizing the quality and quantity of the
training experience to both soldier and organization
alike.

The most significant characteristics of an

"optimal** training site for the MT ARNG include :
1.

The training site should be large enough to

allow all organic units of the 163d AR BDE to train
concurrently.

This would optimize the capability of the

organizational structure to maximally function in a
coordinated, efficient and effective manner.
2.

The training site should have topography

representative of that to which the 163d AR BDE would be
deployed, in accordance with the existing war plans.
3.

The training site should be relatively close to

the home location of the units which comprise the 163d AR
BDE.

Travel time to and from the training site directly

affects the amount of training time which can be devoted
to weapons and tactics.
4.

The training site should have the capability to

incorporate other military organizations into the training
environment, i.e. "combined arms".

Such organizations

might include the Air Force and specific Army units, e.g.,
Special Forces (Rangers, paratroopers), communications,
aviation, etc..

This would provide a realistic battle

field context because of the aforementioned need for
coordination of ground and air resources in the integrated
tactics of battle plans.
5.

The training site should be responsive to the

needs of the units to be trained, specifically in respect
to the time-frame of the training.

This would be

optimized by State of Montana control over the training
site, rather than control by the Department of Defense,
Department of the Army or National Guard Bureau.

6.

The training site should be economically sound.

The State of Montana can, at best, ill afford an
unanticipated outlay of money for training site develop
ment and the United States Department of Defense is
looking at ways to trim its budget.

Therefore, training

site development and maintenance must be cost effective
relative to the perceived benefits, i.e., training
enhancement, national security, economic impact.
7.

The training site should either have a minimal

impact on the site's environment and/or the environment
itself should be essentially uninhabited, unproductive
and/or unusable for other commercial or personal uses
inconsistent with the training activity.
Historically, the 163d AR BDE has held its Annual
Training activities at Gowen Field, Idaho, located twelve
miles south of Boise.

Currently, the Montana National

Guard is actively pursuing the acquisition of Federal,
state, county and private lands and facilities in Valley
County to develop what would be called the Montana
Training Center (MTC).

If developed, practically all MT

ARNG training currently held and resources located at
Gowen Field (and other locations) would be transferred to
the MTC.

The resultant impacts are very significant in

military, economic, environmental and social perspectives
This paper is a preliminary study of the feasibility
of developing the Montana Training Center, a major

training area planned and designed for a wide spectrum of
ground and air training activities.

To be sure, the

proposed size and activities of the MTC raise many
pressing issues.

In the course of this study, the most

significant of these issues will be researched and
presented.

It must be noted that this professional paper

contains information which is considered For Official Use
Only (FOUO)•

This status does not constitute a security

classification,

(i.e.. Confidential, Secret, etc.) and no

material in this paper will compromise classified
documentation or information. However, an FOUO status does
necessitate controlled access to this report.

Only those

individuals who have a "need to know" should have said
access.
1.

Issues to be researched and presented include:
The actual need of such a training site.

In a

context of disarmament, weapons and troop reductions, the
need of the Montana Training Center is debatable.
2.

The advantages and disadvantages of MT ARNG

units utilizing the identified primary location, Gowen
Field, for Annual Training activities.
3.

A description of the Montana Training Center in

terms of facilities, geographical location, configuration
and projected training activities.
4.

A description of the proposed training area's

physical environment and the accompanying controversy.
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5.

The general economic status of Valley County

and the State of Montana, with respective data showing
Montana National Guard economic impact.
The hypothesis of this paper is that the development of
the Montana Training Center would benefit the Montana Army
National Guard and the State of Montana.

Using c[uantita-

tive models supported by qualitative understanding, an
analysis will be constructed to arrive at an assessment of
the proposed training center.

The assessment will

critically appraise the MTC, its physical and operational
parameters, its developmental process, its impact upon the
MT ARNG training program and its prospective economic
impact on the state and on Valley County.

Based upon said

research, this paper will ultimately present recommenda
tions regarding the development of the Montana Training
Center.
Having asserted the intent of this paper, it must be
noted that the development, usage and impacts of the
Montana Training Center are both complex and controver
sial.

Every effort has been made to present information

pertinent to the issues in a concise and cumulative
format, thereby providing a substantive feasibility study
of the development of the Montana Training Center.

CHAPTER TWO
MONTANA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ANNUAL TRAINING
The Montana Army National Guard is comprised primarily
of the 163d AR BDE.

Of the 3,212 soldiers (as of Jan. 3,

1990) who are in the MT ARNG, 2,555 (or 79.5 percent) are
assigned to 163d AR BDE units.

The other units (see

Appendix A) are, as is the 163d, unique to each other in
their resources and wartime mission.

The primary common

ality they share is that all are subordinate units to
Headquarters, State Area Command (HQ STARC).

Because of

the differing specialties of the units, different training
sites are required and utilized for the Annual Training
period.

While the 163d AR BDE Annual Training is

typically held at Gowen Field because it is conducive to
tank operations, the 1049th Engineer Platoon often
performs its Annual Training at the city firefighting
training center in Great Falls where it can optimally
train for its military mission.

An additional example is

the 103d Public Affairs Detachment which has conducted its
Annual Training periods in such places as Korea and
Panama.

These locations provide maximal training for this

unit's mission, the gathering and reporting of news that
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is military in nature.

Appendix A lists the locations of

each MT ARNG unit's typical Annual Training location.
The Gowen Field training site is, by far, the most
extensively utilized Annual Training location by NT ARNG
units.

Therefore, it is the greatest training and econ

omic investment that the MT ARNG makes each year.

The

Montana Training Center would replace Gowen Field as the
Annual Training location for MT ARNG units.

The primary

advantages and disadvantages of training at Gowen Field
are:
1.

Gowen Field Training Advantages.
a.

Gowen Field is operationally ready for

Annual Training activities.

The facilities (barracks,

dining, medical/dental, social, etc.) and field training
areas are established and functional.
b.

Gowen Field is designated by National Guard

Bureau as the regional maintenance/training center for the
Ml Abrams main battle tank.

The great majority of the

163d AR BDE's weapons and training activities revolve
around the Ml Abrams main battle tank.

It is critical,

therefore, that the training site have a maintenance
activity capable of supporting continuous, extensive usage
of this tracked vehicle.

A complimentary activity is the

Ml tank maintenance training capability.

This provides

appropriate training to those soldiers of the 163d AR BDE
who are tracked vehicle mechanics.
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c.

Gowen Field is the Mobilization Station for

the great majority of MT ARNG units (see Appendix A ) .

A

Mobilization Station is the designated facility where MT
ARNG units, upon Federalization, must travel to and stay
for a specific period of time before, in accordance with
classified timetables, they continue on to the embarkation
site(s).

While there, the Federalized unit will complete

final preparations needed for deployment to its overseas
assignment, in accordance with the instituted war plan.
Having Annual Training at Gowen Field facilitates unit
awareness, coordination and rapport with the mobilization
activity's organization, personnel, equipment and
structural resources.
2.

Gowen Field Training Disadvantages.
a.

Valuable training time is lost due to the

length of time it takes to convoy troops and equipment to
and from Gowen Field.

While units in western Montana can

lose up to 4 days due to travel time, units from eastern
Montana can lose up to 6 days.

Given that the total span

of Annual Training is 15 days long, the travel time can
account for, respectively, 25 to 40 percent of the total
training time available.

See Appendix B for mapped

locations of 163d AR BDE units.

Also the mileage from

each unit to Gowen Field and the mileage to the Operations
Center of the proposed Montana Training Center is shown.
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Training time lost due to travel significantly detracts
from the opportunity for the soldiers and command
structure to increase proficiency on equipment, tactical
operations, and command and control functions.

The

abbreviated training time also inhibits the unit's
identification of capability and resource shortfalls and
deficiencies.

These must be identified so that they can

be addressed and remedied.

The Annual Training period at

Gowen Field is the onlv time and place during the training
year where comprehensive weapons, tactics, and command and
control training activities/exercises can be conducted.
b.

The Annual Training period assigned to

Montana units is ultimately determined by the Gowen Field
administration, with input from the MT ARNG command
structure.

Gowen Field is used extensively by many Active

and Reserve Component military organizations.

As a

result, there has been a significantly decreasing
capability for the MT ARNG to attain Annual Training dates
most appropriate or convenient to MT ARNG needs.

An

example of this is the fact that there has been little
consistency as to the time-span when Montana units are
scheduled to train.

The last few years have seen the

Annual Training periods range from March to July.

This

negatively impacts, in varying degrees, a unit's yearly
training program.

Most serious, however, are the

resultant problems created concerning Guardsman's
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employment, education and/or personal needs.
The inconsistent Annual Training dates can create havoc
with a soldier's employment, educational and/or personal
responsibilities.

This potentially leads to stress

between the soldier and his/her employer, course
instructor or family which can result in the soldier being
forced to "choose" between the Guard or job/education/
family.

If this situation develops, typically the soldier

will terminate his/her membership in the Guard.

This is

detrimental to the MT ARNG organization since the soldier
and the resources invested into him/her are lost to the
unit.

Personnel turnover can result in a lessened unit

readiness status because the skills of that soldier are no
longer available and the unit is also, in effect,
"shorthanded".
c.

Gowen Field's facilities, training areas an

support services are limited due to heavy usage by other
military organizations.

Even though the 163d AR BDE would

be deployed as one unit if Federalized, it has never been
able to train as one unit at Gowen Field,

The inability

for the entire 163d AR BDE to train at one time and place
detracts from the ultimate capability of the organiza
tional structure to function in a coordinated, efficient
and effective manner.

Needless to say, this also negates

any possibility for the 163d AR BDE to train concurrently
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with other military organizations.

Given the battlefield

context into which the 163d would be placed, combined arms
training is increasingly vital to unit readiness and
capability for mission accomplishment, and ultimately,
survivability on the battlefield.
d.

Expenditures in the form of organizational

acquisitions such as fuel, rations (food), billets
(housing) and personal outlays for recreation, etc. amount
to a considerable outflow of fiscal resources from Montana
and is, for the most part, lost from the Montana economy.
This outflow is significant in that the wages, payments,
etc. do not originate from the Montana public or private
sector fiscal resource base.
funds.

They are entirely federal

CHAPTER THREE
THE MONTANA TRAINING CENTER
The Montana National Guard proposes to create a ground
and air maneuver and gunnery training site in Valley
County.

It would encompass 981,366 acres (approximately

1,533 square miles, 30 percent of the county's land mass)
and would be divided into two separate, major training
sectors.

The Operations Center of the Montana Training

Center would be located at the currently deactivated
Glasgow Air Force Base which is located about 19 miles
north of the City of Glasgow.

The MTC would be under the

control of the State of Montana, with the Administrator of
the State Department of Military Affairs, Office of The
Adjutant General having full responsibility for all
aspects of the Center's operations.

Funding, prospec-

tively, would be through a combination of federal and
state sources under the auspices of The Adjutant General.
If developed, the MTC would be, by far, the largest
training site in the United States.^

This distinction is

in terms of gross acreage and actual acreage used for
training purposes.

The National Training Center at Ft.

Irwin, California, while currently the largest at almost
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1000 square miles, would be but two-thirds the size.

The

immensity and geographical characteristics of the MTC make
possible a vast spectrum of training activities which
could range from accommodating a MT ARNG tank company
(approximately 76 men and 14 tanks) during a weekend drill
to the entire current force structure (163d AR BDE plus
other units as identified in Appendix A) of the MT ARNG
(potentially

3,813 personnel, 125 tanks, 148 armored

personnel carriers, etc.) during an Annual Training
period.

This represents an unprecedented level of

quality and flexibility of training for not only Montana
National Guard units, but also for any other military
combat organization that may hold its training there.
1.

Purpose.

The mission of the Montana Training

Center is to plan, coordinate and conduct an advanced
level of training for Army and Air Force units of both
Reserve and Active Component forces under mid- to
high-intensity combat conditions.

This is accomplished by

requiring participating units to deploy tactically in
response to a realistic portrayal of potential enemy
forces, all in the context of continuous, stressful "force
on force" combat operations and actual weapons fire
exercises.

Each training activity would incorporate

extensive analysis and feedback. The training activities
would vary in complexity and purpose depending upon the
needs of the participating unit(s).
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2.

Description of the Montana Training Center.

The

lands and facilities which make up the 981,366 acres are a
mixture of federal, state, county and private ownership
(see Appendix C ) .

The great

majority of the acreage

(718,316 or 73 percent) belongs to the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management (ELM).

Access to

ELM and state lands would be

negotiated through long-term lease agreements to insure
stable development program.

a

Private lands would be

negotiated on a case by case basis.

Presented below are

the physical descriptions of the major sectors of the
Montana Training Center and the most significant training
activities to be conducted in each.
a.

Valley County Airport Enterprise.

opertions would be located at what is termed the Valley
County Airport Enterprise (VCAE), which is the former
Glasgow Air Force Ease installation (6,800 acres).

The

name was changed to reflect ownership by Valley County and
is a corporate entity created by the county to do
business.

The VCAE is considered part of the northern

training sector of the Montana Training Center.
Significant assets would be available to MTC operations
and include, but are not limited to;
(1)

13,500 X 300 ft. concrete airstrip
capable of supporting loads in excess
of one million pounds.

(2)

Airfield tower and operations building.

Ease
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(3)

Aircraft hangers and maintenance
facilities.

(4)

Multiple-bay fire station.

(5)

Billeting for 2,700 soldiers, permanent
structures.

(6)

Central dining facility.

(7)

50-bed hospital.

(8)

Dental clinic.

(9)

Extensive ammunition bunker complex.

10)

Fuel storage capacity of 3,170,000
gallons.

11)

Over 1 million sq. ft. of warehouse
space.

12)

Maintenance facilities for heavy motor
vehicle repair, including tanks.

13)

Extensive classroom and administration
facilities.

14)

Post office.

15)

Library.

16)

Chapel.

17)

Theater.

18)

Gymnasium.

19)

Electrical power with transformer
capacity of 10,000 KVA.

20)

Modern water treatment plant with
capacity of processing 3,009,600
gallons per day. Storage capacity of
approximately 1,100,000 gallons.

21)

Sewage collection and transport to
lagoons through a system of lateral and
main lines and lift stations.
The
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lagoons have a capacity of 3 34 acre
feet, adequate for a base population of
8,500 personnel.
(22)

The structures are heated by natural
gas.

No new construction is necessary to house Base
Operations activities at the VCAE.

Base Operations

responsibilities include all administrative and logistical
activities necessary in the day to day operations of the
Montana Training Center.

These include but are not

limited to:
(1)

Administer training unit's schedules.
Coordinate all activities peculiar to
training exercise, i.e., air and ground
support, special equipment, specific
facilities, etc..

(2)

Assist in writing exercise scenarios.

(3)

Provide full support to personnel
residing permanently at the VCAE.

(4)

Provide full support to personnel/units
training at the VCAE.

(5)

Monitor compliance with established
environmental protection/rehabilitation
programs.

(6)

Administer and execute continual
environmental rehabilitation program
and process.

(7)

Manage equipment and supplies storage.

(8)

Schedule maintenance activities.

(9)

Manage VCAE and MTC security.

(10)

Purchase supplies (fuel, food,
medicine, etc.).

Base Operations functions at the Montana Training Center
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would draw upon the support of the local community.

All

supplies and equipment necessary for the normal operations
of the MTC would, to the greatest extent possible, be
purchased directly or contracted from local sources.
b.

The Tactical Maneuver Area (northern

section, 572,660 acres including the VCAE complex).

The

Tactical Maneuver Area (TMA) is located adjacent to the
VCAE and extends north and northwest to the U.S./Canadian
border.

Activity in the TMA would be limited to ground

maneuver and close air support activities conducted on a
rotational basis through seven separate maneuver
corridors.

The corridor selection for training would be

based upon multiple use, soils damage, reseeding, wildlife
and other considerations.

The units which are training

can maneuver only in the selected corridor.

Permanently

assigned MTC personnel and designated "umpires" schedule
corridor usage and monitor compliance.

Appendix C

illustrates the configuration of the TMA.

Training

activities to be conducted in the Tactical Maneuver Area
include:
(1)

Ground Movement.

Military units would

travel cross-country using tanks, armored personnel and
artillery carriers, and wheeled vehicles.

Cross-country

movement would take place day and night.
(2)

Tactical Road March.

A tactical road
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march is the movement of units from one location to
another.

Such movement is usually done with units moving

along a route in a column formation.

It usually is used

to move units from one assembly area to another or from an
assembly area to a defensive position.
(3)

Assemblv Area Operations.

An assembly

area is used to prepare for the training exercises.
Activities in the assembly area include all the
administrative and logistical activities necessary to
conduct the exercise; such as loading ammunition, fueling
vehicles and maintaining equipment.

All training

exercises begin in an assembly area.
(4)

Attack Operations.

Units move from the

assembly area on several routes and in a variety of
formations (such as side-by-side, column, etc.) to attack
and occupy a designated piece of terrain.
(5)

Defense Operations.

Once the unit has

achieved its objective (a designated piece of terrain),
they occupy defensive positions.

At some point in the

exercise, the unit is attacked by an opposing force which
attempts to test the unit's defensive positions.

The

unit must defend against the opposing force.
(6)

Delav Operations.

If the opposing

force is successful, the unit is required to withdraw from
its defensive positions.

This is done by moving elements

from respective defensive positions to a series of
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preplanned defensive positions to the rear.
(7)

Pursuit Operations.

opposing force may retreat.

During combat the

Pursuit training deals with

the tactics of pursuit.
(8)

Withdrawal Operations.

A unit

withdrawal is conducted when it is ordered to leave its
forward defensive positions and move to another area of
the battlefield.

A unit withdraws once another unit moves

forward and takes over the battle positions and defensive
mission.

Fighting positions are turned over to the

substituting element one at a time.

The relieving unit

moves into the same vehicle and personnel positions
occupied by the withdrawing unit.

The maneuver is

conducted as rapidly and as quietly as possible so as to
not alert the opposing force of the movement.
(9)

Relief Operations.

exact opposite of a withdrawal.

A relief is the

In a relief, a unit moves

from the assembly area and occupies the defensive
positions of a unit.

The relief, movement and change-over

must be done without letting the opposing force know what
is occurring.
(10)

Raid Operation.

A raid is the

penetration into enemy territory with a specialized force
to destroy a specific target or capture specific
information and return to friendly positions.

It is
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characterized by rapid maneuver and extensive use of
supporting units.
(11)

Disengagement Operations.

During

combat^ it may be necessary to withdraw from the battle.
Disengagement operations training deals with the tactics
of "retreat".
(12)

Guard Operations.

A unit in a "guard"

posture deploys along the side or rear of its parent unit.
Its purpose is to protect these areas against surprise
enemy activity.

Guard requires extensive patrolling to

ensure that enemy activity is detected and reported.
(13)

Engineer Operations.

Engineer training

activities can be divided into four basic areas:
(a)

Countermobility Operations.

Countermobility is obstacle construction.

Obstacles are

used to decrease the opposing force's mobility without
hindering friendly maneuver.

In open areas, obstacles

extend the amount of time the opposing force's units will
be exposed to the effects of "friendly fire".

One example

includes the various types of anti-tank ditches.
(b)

Mobility Operations.

Mobility

operations reduce the effects of natural or man-made
obstacles which impede the movement of friendly forces or
supplies.

Examples include the demolition or

dismemberment of various obstacles.
(c)

Survivability Operations.

Surviv
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ability operations are characterized by the use of
protective measures that decrease the effectiveness of the
opposing force's firepower while units fight and maneuver.
Survivability measures include the use of counter
surveillance measures such as camouflage, deception, smoke
and the construction of protective positions.
(d)
tions.

Sustainment Engineering

Engineers complete tasks to ensure the continuous

supply of support assets to units.

These tasks include

replacement of tactical bridges, construction and repair
of support facilities, and area damage control.
NOTE:

All engineer operations in the TMA are restricted

to one specific location (see Appendix C )•
(14)

Simulated Chemical Weapons Operati

Non-toxic, simulated chemical weapons would be used
throughout the training exercises to simulate chemical
weapons attacks.
All activities listed are designed to be integrated for
a comprehensive program of movement and tactics training.
The TMA can accommodate an entire brigade through a 12-day
exercise schedule or a company through a 3-day exercise
schedule.

Specific training activities can be conducted

if time or needs do not necessitate the complete program.
Training activities are rotated and time-spaced between
corridors to minimize environmental damage and maximize
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rehabilitation by natural and programmed processes.
c.

The Fire and Maneuver Area (southern sector

408,706 acres).

The Fire and Maneuver Area (FMA) is

designed to train units in the techniques of maneuver and
target gunnery.

The area would be divided into special

ized firing ranges keyed to specific weapons systems.
Ground units would move through the area in designated
controlled corridors and shoot at predesignated targets.
Aircraft would fly within designated airspace and shoot at
ground and towed aerial targets or would drop bombs on
ground targets.
used.

Some high-explosive ordnance would be

All high-explosive ordnance would be fired or

dropped into one designated target area.
identifies each range and area.

Appendix C

Training activities to be

conducted at the Fire and Maneuver Area include:
(1)

Ground Movement Operations.

Tactical

Road March, Assembly Area Operations, Attack Operations,
Defense Operations, Delay Operations, Pursuit Operations,
Withdrawal Operations, Relief Operations, Raid Operations,
Disengagement Operations, Guard Operations and Simulated
Chemical Weapons Operations will be conducted in the FMA
just as previously described in the Tactical Maneuver Area
narrative.
(2)

Engineer Operations.

Combat engineers

will construct various anti-tank ditches, bunker complexes
and individual vehicle fighting positions.

However, most
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of the engineer efforts and projects will be in the TMA.
(3)

Artillery Target Area.

The artillery

target area is the only designated high-explosive impact
area.

Exploding munitions would be fired into this impact

area of approximately 5000 acres and would be (for safety
reasons) the only part of the training area permanently
restricted to other land users.

All other impact areas

would be designated for non-exploding munitions and would
be unrestricted when not being used for gunnery exercises.
(4)

Tank Target Area.

Tanks and armored

personnel carriers would fire 105mm cannon, anti-tank
missiles, 25mm cannon, various machine guns, rifles and
pistols at pop-up targets placed throughout the tank
target area.

Cannon and missile rounds are for practice

only; they duplicate all characteristics of an explosive
round except for the explosion itself.
(5)

Attack Helicopter Target Area.

Heli

copters would fire 30mm cannon practice rounds, anti-tank
missiles and machine guns at ground targets while flying
and hovering in the target area.
(6)

Tactical Air-to-Surface Gunnerv Range.

High-speed jet aircraft would fly into the area, shoot at
and drop nonexploding bombs on ground targets.

High-

explosive bombs would be dropped only within the Artillery
Target Area.

Practice bombs would be dropped on targets
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outside the artillery area.
(7)

Air-to-Air Gunnerv Range.

An aerial

target would be towed by an aircraft in an established
pattern within the range.

The aircraft doing the shooting

would fly into the area and shoot at the towed target with
20mm cannon.

The Air-to-Air Gunnery Impact Area is the

surface danger zone within which all bullets fired at the
target would fall.
(8)
Range.

Controlled Air-to-Surface Gunnerv

Aircraft would make precision-scored bombing runs

on surveyed targets.

The aircraft would drop 2 5 lb.

practice bombs while being observed and scored by
personnel in towers adjacent to the target area.
(9)
fCALFEX).

Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise

A CALFEX trains unit commanders in the

techniques and procedures involved with employing ground
and air forces together in simulated battle.

This

exercise would be conducted in the Tank Target Area.

A

unit or task force would move down a set course with tanks
and armored personnel carriers moving together.

They

would shoot at ground targets while on the move, as well
as during predesignated stops.

Infantrymen would exit the

carriers and shoot at ground targets at certain points
along the course.

Aircraft would shoot at ground targets

in combination with artillery support.

The purpose of

this range exercise is to test the commander's abilities
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to coordinate all aspects of the battle, including the
support assets available to his unit.
(10)

Range Operations Center.

field administration of activities in the Fire and
Maneuver Area during periods of maneuver and gunnery
exercises would be done from a Range Operations Center.
This would require the construction of facilities,
installation of technical instrumentation, leveling and
graveling of parking areas, drilling and installation of a
water well, installation of a sewer system and introduc
tion of electrical power.

Live-fire exercises at the FMA

would be conducted using the Army standard design Multi
purpose Range Complex (MPRC).

The MPRC is an instru

mented, fully automated target practice range which allows
moving tanks, armored personnel carriers and personnel to
maneuver through a pre-set course, firing at stationary
and moving targets.

It allows for helicopter and fighter

aircraft and artillery fire engagements to take place
simultaneously with the ground maneuver forces.

It is

designed to support technically advanced and tactically
active training while replicating realistic combat
conditions.

The instrumentation system permits simulated

or live-fire training scenarios approaching conditions to
be found in battle and provides the data necessary to
formulate an objective evaluation of the unit performance.

Control

29

3.

Montana Training Center Impact.

The MTC would

be unique, on a national scale, in its capabilities and
potential.

Facilities and training areas sufficient to

conduct opposing brigade-sized Field Training Exercises
and Combined Arms Live Fire Exercises are not in existence
anywhere else in the United States.

2

Gunnery ranges would

be available to train Army ground (tanks, armored
personnel carriers, artillery, soldiers) and air (attack
helicopter) assets as well as all Air Force (jet and
bomber) assets in both actual exercise play or strictly
weapons systems familiarization and/or qualification.

The

combined arms training would vary with the size and types
of units involved; however, sufficient maneuver acreage is
present to accommodate any foreseeable need.
Current training maneuvers planning has identified a
prospective schedule which incorporates the environmental,
geographical and social (i.e., hunting season) consider
ations of the proposed training area.

Brigade sized

training exercises could occur up to 4 times per year with
each training exercise lasting approximately 15-21 days.
Battalion and company-sized units could also conduct IDT
training up to 4 6 times per year.

Aerial gunnery exer

cises of up to 50 aircraft (fighters, bombers, attack
helicopters) could take place on the ranges and in the
associated airspace, including air-to-air gunnery
approximately 72 days per year and air-to-ground gunnery
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approximately 250 days per year.

The size of the training

area allows air and ground training activities to occur
simultaneously, either in conjunction with or separate
from each other.
As remarkable as it may seem, no other existing training
area in the United States currently has the size,
capability or flexibility as does the proposed Montana
Training Center.

CHAPTER FOUR
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
The climate and topography in the Montana Training
Center are representative of locations to which the 163d
AR BDE and other MT ARNG units are expected to be deployed
in the event of federal activation.
include (depending upon
and the Middle East.

These locations

the specific unit) Europe, Korea

Weather and soil conditions allow

ground maneuver training to occur 10 months a year; aerial
training would occur throughout the year.

If the MTC were

to reach its full potential of utilization, the year-round
training load would approximate 14,919 personnel, 3,194
wheeled vehicles and 1,553 tracked vehicles.
be in the field 230 days per year.

Units would

Additionally, there

would be localized training in the VCAE area.

The only

restrictions to the military training would occur during
high-density multi-user periods, high-value wildlife use
periods, critical periods of agricultural production and a
total ban on ground maneuver training during the months of
May and June.

(Because these months receive the greatest

quantity of rainfall for the year, the environment is most
susceptable to tracked vehicle damage.)
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To say the least,
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the presence of the Montana Training Center would have a
marked, dominant and far-reaching impact on the environ
ment in 3 0 percent of Valley County.

Described below is

the general environmental context of the Montana Training
Center.^
1.

Climate.

Summer temperatures are hot with

maximum temperatures into the 100 degree (plus) Fahrenheit
range.

Winters are cold at best and life-threateningly

frigid at worst.

Temperatures commonly are sub-zero with

wind chill factors producing temperatures anywhere from
-20 to -70 degrees Fahrenheit.
a.

The training area averages 11.53 inches of

precipitation annually, approximately 40 percent of which
falls between 1 May and 30 June.

The months of May and

June are therefore closed to ground maneuver training in
both the TMA and FMA.
b.

Winds are prevalent year-round with typical

intensity of 7-15 miles per hour.

The predominant wind

direction is from the northwest,
2.

Air Oualitv.

Air quality is excellent because

of the lack of human activity and nearby industry.

All

the public lands have Class II air quality (good), as set
by the State of Montana.

Particulate concentrations are

highest during spring and summer due to nearby farming
operations (such as plowing) and are lowest in the winter.
3.

Topography.

The training area is located in the

33

glaciated Missouri Plateau.

The topography consists of

flat to gently rolling terrain with rugged denuded
badlands type relief in some areas.

Elevations within the

area range from 2,000 feet in the southern sector of the
area to 4,000 feet in the northern sector.

Drainage

systems in the northern sector are complex, with the West
Fork of the Poplar River draining much of the hilly
northeast corner. Porcupine Creek in the central area, and
the Milk River, fed by many small (and usually dry)
tributaries, the balance.

The drainage in the

predominately "badland" southern sector is easterly into
Willow Creek, which drains into the Milk River.
Typically, however, these drainages are dry.
4.

Recreation.

Big game, upland bird and waterfowl

hunting are the major recreational activities in the
proposed training area.

The area is known locally as a

source of trophy mule deer bucks.

Reservoirs provide

waterfowl habitat and some limited hunting opportunities.
A few of the reservoirs serve as trout fisheries. Off-road
vehicle use, usually associated with hunting, is common
throughout the area.

This use is restricted to designated

roads, trails and vehicle ways.

Local residents also use

the area for snowmobi1ing during the heavier snow years.
Other recreational uses include camping, backpacking and
nature study.
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5.

Cultural.

Information about cultural resources

in the area has been collected mainly from clearances
conducted for range projects by the Bureau of Land Manage
ment.

Other archeological fieldwork (random sampling) has

also contributed data which provides information about the
number, quality and type of prehistoric and historic
features present in the study area.
a.

Remnants of human occupation dating back

12,000 years can be found in the region.

Prehistoric

people who frequented the area were hunters and gatherers.
They shifted residences in response to seasonal changes in
food resource opportunities and the never-ending needs of
defense, shelter, water, fuel and raw materials for tool
production.

These groups were usually small, possessing

only what appears to be a limited set of stone, wood and
bone tools.

Bison eventually became a major food source

as newer techniques of trapping the animals were
developed.

The remaining traces of these early peoples

include teepee rings, lithic scatters, bison butchering
sites and isolated stone tools.

Examples of these sites

are situated throughout the proposed training area, the
majority located in the vicinity of water sources.
b.

A portion of the public lands in the

proposed training site area is what were termed "land
utilization lands" or "homestead".

These lands were in

private ownership for a time and then reverted back to
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public ownership when the settlers vacated the area,
primarily because of the harsh environment and national
depression in the 1930*s.
6.

Watershed/Soils,

The training area is composed

of several distinct soil types, two of which make up the
majority of the proposed training center.

The first type

includes approximately 70 percent of the area and consists
of shallow to moderately deep acid clay soils on moderate
ly steep to very steep shale uplands.

These lands consist

of dissected drainage systems with shale outcrops on the
ridge crests and steep side slopes.

The rangelands are

marginal with only 35-45 percent ground cover.

The

surface is characterized in many places by deposits of
glacial rock.

The soils are characterized by moderate to

high runoff and the erosion potential is considered
moderate to severe.

The second type of soil includes the

remaining 30 percent of the area and contains high bench
remnants of continental glacial till.

The soils are deep

clay loam glacial till mantle on nearly level to gently
rolling topography, supporting substantially more ground
cover and higher production potential.

Runoff and erosion

potential are both moderate.
7.

Water Oualitv.

There is a very limited supply

of water in the proposed training area, consisting of
primarily

ephemeral streams and man-made reservoirs.

36

typically less than 5 acres in size.

Water plays a

minimal role in the recreational use of this area, but no
doubt played a maximal role in the transiency of
homesteaders during the land utilization program days.
Waters in the area typically contain high concentrations
of ionic salts (highly saline) and are rated as fair to
poor depending on the time of the year and the source.
8.

Vegetation.

The most common plant species in

the area include western wheatgrass, needle and thread,
blue grama, prairie sanreed, native legumes, silver
sagebrush, creeping juniper, chokecherries, silver
buffaloberry and isolated non-commercial strands of aspen.
No commercial timber exists in the area.
a.

No rare or endangered plant species are

known to exist on the public lands in the proposed
training area.
b.

Leafy spurge is the only noxious plant found

in the area and is found at various locations throughout
the training site.

Known sites are treated with herbi

cides which have not allowed the size of the infestation
to grow.
c.

Plants poisonous to livestock are found in

the area but have not posed any major problems to date.
These species include cocklebur, greasewood and
chokecherry.
9.

Wildlife.

The wildlife found in the proposed
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training site is typical of the eastern glaciated plains.
The abundance of some species is attributed to the higher
percentage of badlands/breaks and open rolling pfairie
landform in the area.
a.

Mule deer are abundant throughout the area.

The badland/breaks topography combined with native prairie
landform lends itself to the needs of these deer on a
yearlong basis and several acreages are considered
particularly important as winter habitat.

This acreage is

located primarily along water course beds and adjoining
hillsides.
b.

A few white-tailed deer occur in a small

portion of the area.

The quaking aspen groves around the

eastern perimeter of the Bitter Creek area (northern
sector) provide the only suitable whitetail habitat of any
consequence.
c.

Antelope use both the breaks and benchlands

located throughout the area.

Their spring, summer and

fall numbers vary in any one location due to the
topography.

Winter concentrations of pronghorn occur in

the general location of the mule deer winter habitat.
d.

Sage and sharp-tailed grouse can be found.

Population levels of these two species would best be
characterized as moderate.

Small numbers and widely

scattered flocks of gray, or Hungarian partridge also
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occur within the area.
e.

All the geese, ducks and shorebird species

common to the glaciated plains can be found in the area.
They do not occur in any large concentrations or in large
numbers.
10.

Threatened/Endangered Species.

eagles pass through this area.

Migrating bald

However a 1984 nesting

survey found no nesting pairs in the county.

Peregrine

falcons migrate through selected areas, but there is no
known existing or potential nesting habitat.

There is the

potential for black-footed ferret habitat, but no
sightings have been made.
11.

Enerav and Mineral Resources.

There is no

known mineral production within the area.

However, the

area does have varying potential for bentonite, uranium,
natural gas, sand and gravel and geothermal energy
sources.
a.

Natural gas is the only energy resource

having a high potential for occurrence in the area.
However, no successful wells have been drilled to date.
From 1972 to 1981, Valley County's wildcat success rate
was 0 percent while adjacent Phillips County's success
rate was 15 percent.
b.

The Federal government owns the mineral

rights on all the public lands in the area.

There is one

abandoned bentonite mine in the southern sector.

The
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mineral rights on this 160 acre parcel are privately
owned.
c.

The State of Montana owns all surface and

mineral rights on state lands.

These state lands are

subject to development and access, and are open to mineral
and grazing leasing.

The lands are physically similar to

the surrounding federal land.
12.

Private Land Holdings.

There are 151,150 acres

of private land located within the proposed training site.
These private inholdings are subject to development and
reasonable access rights.

Except for farming in selected

locations, stock water ponds, and vehicle ways, the
private inholdings are undeveloped and physically similar
to the surrounding public and state lands.
Considerable apprehension exists among Valley County
residents and other interested parties concerning the
impact of training site activities on the land and
wildlife.

The majority of the apprehension is centered on

the tracked vehicles, particularly the 60-ton Ml Abrams
main battle tank and, to a lesser degree, the 18-ton
armored personnel carrier.

There is no question that

these vehicles will definitely disturb the natural state
of the ground.

The balance of said apprehension centers

on the effect of the noise emitted from the vehicles and
aircraft on the wildlife.

Several local landowners and
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environmental groups, including Preserve Rural America,
Citizen's Alert, The Rural Alliance for Military
Accountability, SKYGUARD, the Northern Plains Research
Council and the National Wildlife Federation (among
others) are decidedly opposed to the development.
Certainly, a very extensive and intensive Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) must be developed to fully address
all of the concerns of the Valley County residents and
environmentalist community; and to also satisfy the
mandates of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
and Threatened and Endangered Species Act.

The NEPA

directed EIS would meet the legal and administrative
requirements of the Montana Environmental Policy Act
(MEPA), to which the development of the MTC is also
subject.

This would then preclude EIS duplication by the

State of Montana or its subordinate agencies such as the
State Departments of Lands or Military Affairs.

It also

provides the mechanism by which the State Department of
Land's holdings can be included in the EIS.

The evalu

ation of the Montana Training Center and the products
thereof must meet the mandates of the Federal Land Use
Policy and Management Act (FLPMA).

The quality of the

data, supporting materials, and the resulting evaluation
of the MTC must be such that it can be readily understood
by the public and cooperating agencies, and ultimately, be
able to withstand the scrutiny and/or challenge of
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Congress and the courts.

Estimates of the cost of the EIS

range from $250,000.00 to a hefty $6,819,600.00.^

The

wide disparity in the estimated cost of the EIS is due to
who would prepare the EIS.
will cost the maximum.

If the BLM prepares it, it

Interested contracters have

projected the minimum.
The VCAE and the MT ARNG signed a 2-year lease agree
ment, effective July of 1989, allowing tracked vehicle
training on the Enterprise premises and usage of specific
structural resources.

A reclamation program is currently

underway which is studying the most effective method of
rehabilitating the soil displaced by the tracked vehicles.
Four different reclamation methods have been initiated,
these include:
1.

No reclamation attempted.

2.

Chisel-plow the impacted area.

3.

Grade the impacted area.

4.

Grade and seed the impacted area.

This study will span a three-year period.

It is

designed to provide reclamation data which will be applied
to the "rotation" system of tracked vehicle training to be
conducted in the different corridors.

CHAPTER FIVE
ECONOMIC IMPACT
While there are those who would favor Montana *s National
Guard having a state-based major training site for the
sake of a better prepared military force, there are
probably just as many who would prefer to keep such an
activity out of Montana for environmental and/or
ideological reasons.

Ultimately, any prospective state

investment of financial and political resources or
widespread populace support for such a training area is
dependent upon a demonstrated potential for generating
revenue in excess of the developmental and maintenance
costs.

Indeed, the basic methodological problem is

quantifying the various costs and benefits associated with
such a proposal.

The full extent of the expense, given

construction, refurbishment and maintenance needs, private
lands acquisition, impact on school trust lands revenue,
recreation, EIS, etc. cannot be fully determined at this
time.

Just as certainly, the economic benefits of such a

site are unclear and cannot be accurately measured.

There

is, however, evidence of the economic impact the Montana
National Guard has had on Montana and in Valley County.
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This information will be presented in the general context
of Montana's and Valley County's economic environment.
1.

The General Economic Environment of Montana.

An

article in the most recent edition of Montana Business
Quarterly stated that the state's economy, as measured by
non-farm labor income will grow by 1.7 percent in 1989 and
then improve 1-5 percent annually in 1990 and 1991.

Paul

Polzin, Director of the University of Montana's Business
and Economic Research, states that "This is only a modest
increase by U.S. standards, but it certainly looks good
compared to the declines we've experienced in six of the
last nine years."

What growth the state has experienced

is due primarily to the expansion of Montana's mining
industries and the stabilization of employment declines
for railroads and oil and gas exploration companies.
However, Polzin also states that if a predicted nationwide
recession occurs, "all bets are off".

Even if the

national economy remains stable, Montana's economy will
still trail the expected national pace of about 2.3
percent annual growth, and in fact, the economy of Montana
has shrunk by an estimated 9 percent during the past
decade.

This is evidenced by the projection that an

increase of approximately 6,000 non-farm jobs between
1988-91 will make the job total in 1991 only slightly
higher than in 1979.^
Montana's economy has lost significant ground during the
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1980*s and if Mr. Polzin*s projections are valid, the
early 1990 *s will regain little of the state *s lost
economic strength.

One of the more discouraging

indicators of the Montana economy is a decrease in
population significant enough to possibly lose a seat in
the United States House of Representatives.

The state *s

personal property tax is regarded by many as the primary
growth retardant.

Dennis Burr, President of the Montana

Taxpayers Association maintains that the high tax rates on
business personal property has made Montana noncompetitive
with other states in the region.

He states, **The tax

system has become an important element in location
decisions and business has been leaving Montana for more
favorable tax treatment in other states. **

He further

notes that between 1985 and 1988 more than $3 00 million
worth of business machinery and equipment has been removed
from Montana, and therefore, Montana *s property tax base.
Comparative examples of Montana *s personal property tax
and its impact on business are:^
a.

Stone Container is in the paper products

industry with 175 facilities and sales of $6 billion.

In

1990, the Missoula plant will pay almost $4 million in
personal property taxes.

This represents the highest of

the 12 facilities in Stone *s mill division.

The next

highest personal property tax cost is at the mill in
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Snowflake, Arizona which pays $1.5 million.

Plants in

Hodge, Louisiana and in Florida and Georgia will pay about
$1.2 million and $1 million respectively.
b.
six states.

General Mills operates seven flour mills in
Its plant in Great Falls produces 8 percent

of total daily production, but accounts for 25 percent of
the total property tax paid on the seven plants.

Property

taxes in Great Falls are equivalent to $43.00 per
hundredweight of product compared to an average in the
other states of $9.20.
c.

The Western Sugar plant in Billings produces

24 percent of the company's sugar and pays 52 percent of
the company's property tax.

A piece of equipment on which

property taxes of $1,278.00 were paid in 1988 in Lovell,
Wyoming is assessed a $9,366.00 tax in Billings.
d.

U.S. West paid property taxes equivalent to

$32.15 per $1,000.00 of investment in Montana in 1985, but
averaged $15.44 per $1,000.00 in the other seven states in
which it operates.
A strategy the Montana Legislature has used is to offer
specific out-of-state business interests personal property
tax breaks as an incentive to locate in Montana.

Examples

include the now established Canola plant in Butte and a
proposed (though ultimately not placed) malting barley
plant in Billings.

There are those who would wonder why a

Montana business does not deserve a tax break at least as
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much as an out-of-state concern.

At any rate, Montana's

economic development strategy problems are further
compounded by the adversarial relationship between the
Governor's Office and the State Legislature.

1991's

version of the annual budget shortfall is expected to be
$107 million.

If past performance is any indicator, the

deficit remedy will be in the form of another surtax on
personal income.
The property tax remains the primary source of revenue
for Montana's state and county budgets.

The state's

reliance on property taxes to pay for government services
is the highest in the nation with 48 percent of the total
state and local tax revenue coming from the property tax.
The national average is 30 percent.

p

The introduction of

a sales tax designed to proportionally reduce the personal
property tax is biannually presented as the heart of a
revamped tax system which would (supposedly) encourage
economic development.

However, it has been proven time

and time again that the passage of such a tax is
politically unrealistic in the foreseeable future.

Given

the inability for Montana's government to fashion a viable
program of economic development, the state continues to be
dependent upon national and international economic policy
and developments, with little control over its own
economic destiny.

An obvious example is the oil and gas
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industry.

In 1984, Montana collected $134 million in oil

tax revenue.

Unfortunately, by 1988 the "boom" was a

"bust" and only $17 million was collected.^

Indeed,

there are few areas in which Montana has demonstrated any
capability of control over its own economic destiny.
However, the tourism and mining are currently the two most
rapidly expanding and promising industries.
2.
County*

The General Economic Condition of Valley
As the economy of Montana counties and

communities has generally suffered (with the exception of
those few who have benefited due to the tourism and mining
industries), so has that of Valley County.

Valley

County's economy is dependent upon the agriculture
industry, i.e., farming, stock production and supporting
businesses such as implement, seed and fertilizer dealers.
This dependence on agriculture carries with it the
vulnerabilities of that industry.

The economy is

vulnerable in that the federal government is an ever more
dominant (and unreliable) factor in the "success" of the
farm or ranch.

Additionally, there is still "Mother

Nature" to deal with in the form of drought, flood,
windstorm and other natural disasters.

Personal income in

wages and salaries has dropped to $42,369,000.00 in 1986
compared to $62,252,000.00 in 1 9 8 1 . Reflective of the
very substantial economic recession in the county is the
drop in population.

In 1980, Valley County had 10,250
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residents, in 1988 the population was 8,400.

The loss of

1,900 people was the fourth largest population loss in the
state and the -18.2 percent loss rate was second highest.
Glasgow's loss of 1,040 people was the third largest
statewide and the -2 3.4 percent loss rate was the highest
of any city over 1,000 residents (third overall behind
Plevna, -30.9 percent and Walkerville, -24.9 percent).
3.

Montana National Guard Economic Impact.
a.

MONTANA.

Total federal expenditures on the

Montana National Guard for fiscal year 1988 (October 1,
1987 thru September 30, 1988) was $61,107,000.00.

This

figure is comprised of pay, local purchases for items such
as food and fuel, operating expenses required to maintain
the unit armories located throughout the state and
expenses related to the reorganization of the Montana Army
National Guard into the 163d AR BDE.

Additionally, the

State of Montana contributed $804,900.00 for operations
and maintenance for a total of $61,911,900.00 (98.6
percent of which is federal).

Of particular interest is

"wages, local purchases and contracting"

($45,723,700.00),

which represents the monies that have the greatest impact
on the individual communities in which Guard units are
located.

Of the $45,723,700.00, $44,918,800.00 (98

percent) are federal funds.
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Appendix D lists the said

expenditures in each community where an MT ARNG unit is

49

located (as of Sep, 30, 1988).

These figures are based

upon the $45,723,700.00 figure.
b.

VALLEY COUNTY.

As identified in Appendix D

Valley County and Glasgow specifically benefit from the
presence of an Army National Guard unit.

In fiscal year

1988, the total federal and state expenditure was
$306,600.00, $295,600.00 (96.4 percent) of said total
being federal funds.
4.
Training Center.

13

Prospective Economic Impact of the Montana
The full economic impact of the

activation of the Montana Training Center is impossible at
this time to ascertain.

Data solicited from the National

Training Center at Ft. Irwin, CA (which most closely
represents the types of training activities to be con
ducted at the MTC) indicates that a single brigade-sized
Annual Training period generates approximately $1 million
in payments to the training center location specifically
and state g e n e r a l l y . P l a n s call for the Montana Training
Center to, upon full activation, rotate four brigade-sized
elements through the training cycle per year.

Addition

ally, it is estimated that 150 to 200 people would be
employed at the MTC if fully activated.
Under the current usage context whereby MT ARNG units
train at the VCAE one to two weekends per month (as part
of the aforementioned lease agreement between the VCAE and
the Montana Army National Guard), approximately $13,000.00
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in direct payment to the community is generated for fuel
and food.

Additionally, approximately $10,000.00 is paid

in wages for a total of $23,000.00.

This infusion of

federal funds is a conservative estimate for one unit
consisting of 80-100 s o l d i e r s F o u r soldiers have been
hired full-time in support of the current training
activities at the VCAE and planning activities for the
proposed Montana Training Center.

Two of the soldiers,

with a combined annual payroll of $41,688.00, live in
Valley County.

The other two, with a combined annual

payroll of $62,018.00, live in Helena.
As illustrated earlier in the general assessments of the
state's and Valley County's economic status, each unit's
home location and the state generally benefits from the
presence of the National Guard.

Unfortunately, a

significant amount of funds is still lost to the state.
Approximately $2 million per year is spent training
soldiers and airmen outside the state while at Annual
T r a i n i n g . T h e s e training and equipment maintenance
monies would be kept in-state if the Montana Training
Center were developed.
5.
County.

Possible Negative Economic Impact to Valley
Just as the positive economic impacts cannot be

assessed at this time, neither can the negative.

Listed

are the areas most visibly vulnerable to the development
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of the Montana Training Center.
a.

Of the approximate 701 ranch and farm

operations in Valley County, 110 of them, holding 86
federal, state and county grazing leases, have operations
on land in the proposed training area.

The ranches are

cow-calf and yearling operations, and the farms are
dry-land grains and fodder.

The majority of the ranches

and farms are family-owned with a few of the operations
having more than one family associated with the operation
(the 110 ranches involve 130 families).

Livestock sales

and cash crops are the primary source of income in the
a r e a . A very significant factor is that great value is
placed on the Bureau of Land Management and State Lands
leases a farmer/rancher may possess.

In fact, the value

of the holdings is linked directly to that leased land.
If that land is lost to the farmer/rancher, there may be a
potentially serious, negative economic impact.
b.

Hunting is the primary recreational activity

in the area that generates revenue other than ranching and
farming.

It is estimated that hunting expenditures for

travel, food, lodging and fees (variable expenditures)
average $41.00 per day for resident and nonresident
hunters (1988 Net Economic Value of Hunting in Montana,
Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks).

Based on

6,818 hunter days annually in the training area, hunting
deer and antelope generates about $257,424.00 annually in
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direct expenditures to the local economy (i.e., sporting
goods stores, motels, service stations, etc.)
c.

105,100 acres belong to the Montana

Department of State Lands.

This acreage produces about

$80,000.00 for the state schools, specifically those in
Valley County.
6.

Summary.

The economic problems Montana endure

are deeply entrenched and unlikely to be resolved in the
forseeable future.

The state, counties and cities seek to

widen their respective tax bases to more adequately fund
public services, however, to do so requires more business/
industrial activity.

If said activity develops, more jobs

are available and as the population increases to fill
those positions, the tax base is strengthened.
Statistics show that Valley County and the City of
Glasgow have been particularly hard hit by Montana's
recession.

Additionally, the two industries that show the

greatest promise currently for the state, mining and
tourism, are not likely to benefit either the county or
city.

Of low profile is the significant statewide

economic impact of the Montana National Guard.

Projected

usage by Montana Guard resources and prospective
utilization by out-of-state entities coupled with existing
economic impact data from comparable training sites
present a potential economic impact which Valley County
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and Montana cannot ignore or trivialize.
The proposed EIS to be prepared by the BLM or another
mutually acceptable contracted entity would include an
in-depth and comprehensive economic impact analysis.
Preliminary economic indicators would seemingly support
the development of the Montana Training Center.

CHAPTER SIX
THE MEED
The actual need for the Montana Training Center is a
controversal issue which is amplified given the enormous
size, prospective training activities, perceived multipleuse conflicts and the proposed withdrawal of 5,000 acres
of public lands.

Given the generally acknowledged

lessening of worldwide tensions, the argument of whether
or not the training center fulfills a valid military need
is fundamental to the case made by both the opponents and
proponents of the Montana Training Center.

Addressed

below, in the context of military need, are identified
"pros" and "cons" of the development.
1.

It is NOT Needed.
a.

The economy of the United States has become

increasingly dependent upon military spending.

In 1978,

defense oriented industries employed 5,839,000 persons.
When this figure is combined with civilian and military
personnel directly hired by the Department of Defense and
defense related government agencies, the combined
employment supporting the defense system for 1978 was
8,942,000, or 10.5 percent of all employment, both public
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and private, in the United States!

Of course, this

does not take into account the unprecedented defense
spending buildup during the Reagan years.

The main point

is that an economy based upon defense spending is not ‘
good economics and, in fact, may be one of the primary
causes of the budget deficit.
b.

In response to increasing Congressional

pressure to reduce Department of Defense expenditures, the
Secretary of Defense has proposed an initial cut of $2 0
billion for fiscal year 1991 with an additional $180
billion in cuts programmed for the years 1992-1994.
Accompanying the cuts, the Army plans to cut 200,000
personnel (civilian, reserve and active duty) from its
force structure.
c.
Europe.

oi

The world is witnessing history in Eastern

The collapse of the Communist governments

throughout the region is as breathtaking in its rapidity
as it is stunning in its potential economic and political
impacts.

These in turn will impact the Warsaw Pact.

This

military organization of Eastern European Communist
countries was formed to counterbalance the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Soviet Union has always

been the dominate member of the Warsaw Pact, overseeing
and exercising ultimate command over the military
organizations of each member nation.

This was directly

attributable to the Soviet Union's authority over each
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nation's Communist governments.

This authority has been

dramatically eroded by the continuing movement towards and
formation of non-communist governments.

Two factors play

heavily into the expected deterioration of the Warsaw
Pact:
(1)

The governments of the countries are

mandated by the people to improve each respective nation's
economies.

The limited resources will be, in varying

degrees, reallocated from the military to economic
development programs.
(2)

The reallocation of national resources

from the military will be more probable because the
governments are now more accountable and answerable to the
populace rather than to the Soviet Union.
The erosion of the Warsaw Pact, with respect to
solidarity and resource commitment, can be viewed as a
reduction in tensions and the probability of conflict
between it and NATO.
kind.

NATO member nations will respond in

It is even possible that the Warsaw Pact could

dissolve.

If this were to happen, NATO conceiveably would

follow suit.

Such a development may even be the result of

negotiations between the two organizations.
d.

Prior to the landmark political changes in

Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and United States had
already agreed upon and implemented military reductions in
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equipment and personnel in Europe.

Significant quantities

of U.S. military forces based in Europe are in the process
of reassignment back to the mainland.

Additional troop

reductions have been proposed by President Bush.
e.

Training areas existing in both Montana and

out-of-state locations have been utilized for years and
have provided satisfactory training.

It is not necessary

to build another one.
f.

Given the facts that the Department of

Defense is cutting its budget, Montana has no visible
funding available to finance a training site and peace is
"breaking out all over" in Europe, it is simply not
appropriate to burden the taxpayer with building the
largest training site of its type in the nation.
These considerations, separately and in total, present
just cause to critically question the military need for
developing the Montana Training Center.
2.

It IS Needed.
a.

There exists in the United States a very

limited quantity of training centers where large-scale
combined arms training integrated with ground and air
gunnery ranges exist:

the National Training Center at Ft.

Irwin and Camp Pendleton, California, Ft. Bliss and Ft.
Hood, Texas, Yakima Firing Center, Washington, Ft. Carson,
Colorado and Gowen Field, Idaho.

All listed, with the

exception of Gowen Field, are federal installations which
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predominately train Active Component u n i t s . T h e y are all
very heavily utilized and are incapable of programming
additional training time in that they are used year-round
at their full potential.

The reassignment of U.S. Army

units from overseas to the U.S. only intensifies the
current limitations present in training sites at both the
national and state levels.

The units reassigned must

still train and since all will have returned from NATO
combat elements, it follows that many will be tank and
artillery units which require maneuver and gunnery ranges
on which to train (as opposed to Military Police,
Intelligence and communications units which do not require
such areas to maintain and/or enhance their operational
readiness).

This presents two options.

One is that new

areas must be developed to meet this need.

The second,

assuming that no new areas can be developed, is that the
existing training sites schedule units in for training on
a less frequent basis or for a shorter period of time to
accommodate the additional unit load.

This situation

would have a negative impact on the operational readiness
of the affected military forces.

The same considerations

exist for Air Force units which are reassigned back to the
United States.

The expected Pentagon recommendation to

close twenty-four military bases located in the U.S.
further necessitates additional training areas since those
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assets at the closed bases will have been lost.
b.

While the currently programmed and

prospective troop reductions, troop stationing
realignments and base closures negatively impact the
availability of training areas, they also pose logistical
problems for the equipment and supplies organic to each
organization.

Although an armor division, for instance,

may be deactivated, the tanks, armored personnel carriers,
rifles, food service equipment and communications equip
ment will not disappear as the manpower might.

There will

be the need for storage, security and maintenance of very
large quantities of equipment and supplies.

There is in

excess of 1 million square feet of unused warehouse space
(all of which can be heated) at the abandaned Glasgow Air
Force Base which could be made available, exclusive of the
storage needs of the Montana National Guard.
c.

Low-altitude NATO forces flight training in

Europe is increasingly controversial, unpopular, dangerous
and unavailable.

The relatively small land mass and large

population does not avail itself to the type of training
the air forces need, i.e., air-to-ground and air-to-air
weapons training and low-altitude flying skills enhance
ment.

This impacts all NATO nations and has resulted in

increasing quantities of NATO aircraft training at ranges
in the United States and Canada.
d.

The "hub center" concept airlines use in the
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U.S. has significantly impacted Air Force jet and Army
helicopter flight training.

Many of the military bases

are located near major cities which are "hubs" for air
travel.

A hub's air traffic congestion is continuous and

covers an extremely large air space, thus requiring that
the training be conducted a long distances from the base.
The aforementioned considerations reflect national and
even international training needs supportive of developing
additional training sites with capabilities comparable to
that of the Montana Training Center.

A more immediate

consideration, however, is the needs of the Montana
National Guard.

Both the Montana Army and Air Guards must

conduct the great majority and the most significant (in
terms of tactics and weapons) of their training out-ofstate.

This presents three militarily negative impacts:
a.

The time required to proceed to and return

from the designated training site detracts from the
quantity of training which can be conducted.
b.

The limited capabilities of the assigned

training sites detract from the quality of the training
which is conducted (i.e., the 163d AR BDE cannot train as
one organizational structure even though, if Federalized,
it would be deployed as one).
c.

The limitations on the quantity and quality

of current training site resources have a negative impact
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on the unit's combat readiness, capability for mission
accomplishment and ultimate survivabilitv of the soldiers

CHAPTER SEVEN
RECOMMENDATIONS
The preceding sections have been presented for the
purposes of identifying a major shortcoming in the Montana
National Guard's training program, the proposed solution
to that shortfall (development of the Montana Training
Center) and the key areas of consideration and
controversy.

Each key area has, to the most attainable

extent, been illustrated, delineated and/or investigated
to present as complete a view as possible.

The ultimate

purpose and expression of this presentation is to conduct
a preliminary study of the feasibility of developing the
Montana Training Center and, ultimately, to state any
recommendations that are derived from this process.
Researching the "hard" data, attending the BLM public
meeting in Helena, visiting with various interested and
effected individuals, and touring the land where the
Montana Training Center would be located have led to
certain findings.

These are described below with each

followed by an appropriate recommendation:
1.

The single most persuasive concept to most

people is the economic impact of the proposed development
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and current Montana National Guard operations statewide.
Both the present operations and the potential of the
Montana Training Center represent significant infusion of
primarily federal monies into the state and county.
Recommendation:

The Montana National Guard must invest

in an updated, comprehensive economic impact analysis of
Guard operations statewide and prepare as detailed an
analysis as possible of the prospective economic impacts
of

the Montana Training Center, both in strictly Montana

National Guard utilization and fullv developed contexts.
Upon completion, the analysis should be distributed
statewide to the general populance and to specific
organizations such as Chambers of Commerce, Rotary Clubs
and VFWs.
2.

The mandated reductions of U.S. Army military

personnel because of defense budget and perceived military
threat considerations, in reality, adds to the nation's
dependence on the Reserve Component (RC), i.e., Army
National Guard and Army Reserve, and RC training assets.
The United States military strength depends on what is
termed the Total Force.

No longer is the Active Component

solely responsible for combat readiness and duty.

It is

much less expensive to the American taxpayer to upgrade
the Reserve Component in authorized quantity of personnel,
training opportunity and equipment than it is to do the
equivalent to the Active Component.

Therefore, there are
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developments such as Montana's reorganization into an
armored brigade which requires more units, more soldiers,
more expensive equipment (Ml tanks, latest editions of
armored personnel carriers, etc.)/ more full-time support
personnel and more money for training soldiers in the
resultant additional military occupational specialties.
It is a fact that the U.S. could not engage in an extended
or intensive conflict without activating Reserve Component
units.

Appendix E provides examples of the relationship

between the Army's Active and Reserve Components.^3 with
reductions in the Active Component, the Reserve Component
assumes a greater role in the nation's defense.

With that

increased dependence comes the increasingly more urgent
needs of operational readiness, i.e., training.
Recommendation:

The Montana citizenry must be educated

as to the impacts that overseas troop reassignment and
in-country base closures actually have on training site
resources.

Additionally, the vital and integrated role

that the Montana National Guard plays in national defense
should be presented.

I further recommend that the

presentation be part of the updated economic impact
analysis refered to in "b.".
3.

The great majority of the land on which the

Montana Training Center would be located is, at best,
marginal for agricultural interests.

It is land that is
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generally so bare that ranchers need 80 acres to sustain
one cow for six months.

A land that is so generally

devoid of human environmental comforts that the entire
southern section, 4 08,706 acres, is uninhabited by man.
The National Wildlife Federation and the Natural Resources
Defense Council have determined that 42 percent of the
more than 39 million acres of BLM rangeland is in poor
condition, suffering from overgrazing, mismanagement and
underfunding.
Recommendation:

The status of Montana BLM rangeland,

specifically that which is in Valley County, should be
determined.

This would be accomplished by researching

BLM, National Wildlife Federation and Natural Resources
Defense Council studies and data.

Objectives would be to

find out if current rangeland usage is the most
appropriate and beneficial for the land, provides the best
return on the dollar for the taxpayer and is utilized in
the best interests of the common good.
4.

A little considered potential economic impact is

in regards to Native Americans living in the northeast
sector of the state whose unemployment rates commonly run
as high as 7 0 percent.

A tribal-backed group in Wolf

Point, the Wolf Point Community Organization recently
purchased and moved to Wolf Point the Great Divide
Manufacturing Company of Helena which manufactures
military silhouettes for target practice.
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Recommendation:

The potential economic impact and

opportunities the development of the Montana Training
Center could have on Native Americans should be studied as
part of a larger study which would identify potential
defense-related industries which may be attracted to the
VCAE complex.

This study would be based such factors as

facilities available, environmental assets (clean air,
small population), potential workforce and legislatively
mandated inducements designed to attract the businesses or
facilitate development by in^state investors.
5.

The expense of an Environmental Impact Study is

prohibitive if sole reliance is on state resources, be the
price-tag $250,000.00 or $7,000,000.00.
Recommendation:

If the arguments of significant

positive impact for national defense are valid, financial
support from the Department of Defense should be
available.

Montana's U.S. Senators and Representatives

must be lobbied for their active support and persistant
efforts to obtain the needed funding for the EIS.
6.

Glasgow Air Force Base was built in 1959 for

$110 million and was designed for 3,500 military and an
additional 5,000 family members.

Within twenty years the

base was closed down due to treaty negotiations (as
opposed to ratifications^ between the United States and
the Soviet Union.

The structural resources are
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astounding.

Cases in point include storage capabilities

of over 1 million square feet, housing quarters complete
with furniture, appliances, even dishes, and a runway
which at over 13,000 feet in length is the third longest
in the nation and is the fourth alternative for landing
the space shuttle.

All the structures and facilities are

in exceptional shape because of a $4 million grant the Air
Force gave Valley County when the base was deeded over.
These funds were specifically for maintenance and
development of the base, but are expected to be completely
expended this fiscal year.
Recommendation:
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The taxpayer investment into Glasgow

Air Force Base is large and the intent of using the
facility for military purposes is unquestioned.

Because

maintenance monies are expended, it is critical that the
facilities and structures be used immediately or
deterioration will rapidly take its toll and the complex
will be rendered, in large part, unusable.

The former air

base was constructed for the military and its optimum
usage is by the military.

Given demonstrable need, the

base should be available for training/administrative
activities of the Montana National Guard.
7.

The existence of the 5,000 acre artillery range

has the greatest potential to "derail" the land lease
agreement with the BLM.

The Engle Act requires that any

proposal to withdraw 5,000 or more acres of public land
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from public use must be reviewed by the Federal Lands and
Parks Subcommittee in the House of Representatives.
Administrative review by this subcommittee would
essentially "kill" the proposal since it is Chaired by
Representative Vento of Wisconsin.

The Congressman has

publically denounced the efforts of the military to create
or enlarge training areas in the United States.
Recommendation:

The Montana National Guard must be

prepared to terminate the proposed withdrawal of the highexplosive impact area and use it as the other ranges are
envisioned and planned, for nonexplosive munitions.
8.

The most controversal issue of the proposed

development is the expected damage to the land resulting
from tracked vehicle training maneuvers.

Though a

comprehensive reclamation study program is underway (as
identified in page 41) and the latest of environmental
management technologies is utilized in all stages of
development, there is still (understandably) great public
concern and skepticism as to the National Guard's ability
to fulfill its environmental responsibilities.
Recommendation:

It is essential that, to the greatest

extent possible, public participation in all areas of
environmental concern be maximized.
of this would be two-fold.

The primary benefits

First, the National Guard can

benefit from the input of those citizens who have first
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hand knowledge and experience with the land impacted by
"Guard" training.

This should result in more efficient,

practical and reasonable land usage and reclamation
programs.

Secondly, the general populace will perceive

that the Montana "Guard" is responsive to public concerns
and input and is, indeed, making a good faith attempt at
being a "good neighbor".

This should result in greater

cooperation and good will between the "Guard" and public.
Additionally, as public recommendations are incorporated
into the planning and training processes, the public will
gain "ownership" in said processes.

This facilitates

support and trust in the Montana National Guard.
In summation, this study concludes that development of
the Montana Training Center at the (former) Glasgow Air
Force Base appears feasible and desirable in light of
Montana National Guard training needs.

However, as

identified by each specific recommendation, additional
study and/or project development is required in specific
areas.

APPENDIX A
KEY
AHC

ATTACK HELICOPTER COMPANY

AR BDE

ARMORED BRIGADE

ASGD

ASSIGNED

AT

ANTI-TANK

AUTH

AUTHORIZED

AVN

AVIATION

CAV

CAVALRY

DET

DETACHMENT

ENGR PLT

ENGINEER PLATOON

FA

FIELD ARTILLERY

HHC

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

HQ STARC

HEADQUARTERS, STATE AREA COMMAND

HQ & SVC AHB

HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE ATTACK
HELICOPTER BATTALION

IN

INFANTRY

LOG

LOCATION

MAINT

MAINTENANCE

MED

MEDICAL

MOB

MOBILIZATION

PAD

PUBLIC AFFAIRS DETACHMENT

PER SVC CO

PERSONNEL SERVICES COMPANY

S&T

SERVICE AND TRANSPORTATION

SPT BN

SUPPORT BATTALION

TRP

TROOP
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APPENDIX A (cont.)
MONTANA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS
LOCATION

PERSONNEL
AS6D AUTH

ANNUAL
TRNG LOG

MOB
STATION

YEAR-RD
YEAR-RD
YEAR-RD

HELENA
HELENA
HELENA

HQ STARC
DET 1 HQ STARC
DET 2 HQ STARC

HELENA
HELENA
HELENA

271
27
5

231
29
5

1030 PAD

HELENA

17

13

1049TH ENGR PLT

HELENA

20

22

210TH PER SVC CO

HELENA

39

57

HQ & SVC AHB CO
1-189TH AVN
CO A AHC
CO B AHC
CO C AHC

HELENA

167

166

VARIES

HELENA
HELENA
HELENA

39
39
33

37
37
37

VARIES
VARIES
VARIES

195
HHC(-) 163D AR BDE BOZEMAN
LIVINGSTON 69
DET 1 HHC
DET 2 HHC
HARLOWTON 48

190
69
60

GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD

1063D(-) ENGR CO
DET 1 1063D

MISSOULA
G R . FALLS

82
79

70
122

GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD

TRP E(-) 163D CAV
DET 1 TRP E

MALTA
GLASGOW

68
85

65
72

GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD

1-163D CAV BN
HHC(-) 1-163D CAV
DET 1 HHC
DET 2 HHC

131
BUTTE
DEER LODGE 33
41
ANACONDA

131
51
52

GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD

CO
CO
CO
CO

DILLON
HAMILTON
HELENA
G R . FALLS

VARIES

FT LEWIS,
WA
GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
ID
YEAR-RD
UNDETERMD
FT LEWIS,
WA
FT LEWIS
FT LEWIS
FT LEWIS

163D AR BDE UNITS

A
B
C
D

1-163D
1-163D
1-163D
1-163D

CAV
CAV
CAV
CAV

2-163D CAV BN
HHC(-) 2-163D CAV
DET 1 HHC
DET 2 HHC

73
59
57
54

76
76
76
76

KALISPELL 109
47
LIBBY
WHITEFISH 38

131
51
52

71

GOWEN
GOWEN
GOWEN
GOWEN

FLD
FLD
FLD
FLD

GOWEN
GOWEN
GOWEN
GOWEN

FLD
FLD
FLD
FLD

GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD
GOWEN FLD GOWEN FLD

APPENDIX A (cont.)
163D AR BDE UNITS

PERSONNEL
LOCATION A8GD AÜTH

2-163D CAV BN (cont.)
CO A 2-163D CAV
KALISPELL
CO B 2-163D CAV
MISSOULA
CO C 2-163D CAV
MISSOULA
CO D 2-163D CAV
SHELBY

58
56
54
44

76
76
76
76

ANNUAL
TRNG LOG

MOB
STATION

GOWEN
GOWEN
GOWEN
GOWEN

GOWEN
GOWEN
GOWEN
GOWEN

FLD
FLD
FLD
FLD

FLD
FLD
FLD
FLD

1-163D IN BN
HHC 1-163D IN

BILLINGS

165

243

CO A 1-163D IN

BILLINGS

64

110

FT CARSON GOWEN FLD
CO
FT CARSON GOWEN FLD

CO B(-) 1-163D IN
DET 1 CO B

GLENDIVE
SIDNEY

47
33

50
60

FT CARSON GOWEN FLD
FT CARSON GOWEN FLD

CO C(-) 1-163D IN
DET 1 CO C

CULBERTSON 42
PLENTYWOOD 41

50
60

FT CARSON GOWEN FLD
FT CARSON GOWEN FLD

CO D(-) 1-163D IN
DET 1 CO D

LEWISTOWN
CHINOOK

46
49

50
60

FT CARSON GOWEN FLD
FT CARSON GOWEN FLD

CO E(AT) 1-163D IN MILES CITY 52

73

FT CARSON GOWEN FLD

495TH SPT BN
HHC 495TH SPT

HAVRE

CO A(-) S&T 495TH
DET 1 CO A

MISSOULA
BILLINGS

CO B MAINT 495TH

HELENA

CO C(MED) 495TH

BILLINGS

163D AR BDE UNITS TOTAL
OTHER UNITS TOTAL
PERSONNEL TOTALS
NOTE:

157

154

VARIES

GOWEN FLD

64
54

77
76

VARIES
VARIES

GOWEN FLD
GOWEN FLD

171

276

VARIES

GOWEN FLD

65

110

VARIES

GOWEN FLD

2555 3173
657

640

3212 3813

TWO ADDITIONAL 163D AR BDE UNITS ARE LOCATED IN
WYOMING:
DET 1 CO B 495TH SPT BN & 3-49TH FA BN

BECAUSE THEY ARE IN WYOMING, THEY ARE PART OF THE WYOMING
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD
MOBILIZE WITH THE MT ARNG.
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APPENDIX B
1630 AR BDE UNITS
UNITS
HHC(-) 1630 AR BDE
DET 1 HHC
DET 2 HHC

DISTANCE (MILEAGE) TO:
GOWEN FIELD MTC OP CENTER
LOCATION
384
525
BOZEMAN
358
551
LIVINGSTON
279
621
HARLOWTON

1063DC-) ENGR CO
DET 1 1063D

MISSOULA
GREAT FALLS

350
596

458
290

TRP E(-) 163D CAV
DET 1 TRP E

MALTA
GLASGOW

797
867

89
19

1-163D CAV BN UNITS
HHC(-) 1-163D CAV
DET 1 HHC
DET 2 HHC
CO A 1-163D CAV
CO B 1-163D CAV
CO C 1-163D CAV
CO D 1-163D CAV

BUTTE
DEER LODGE
ANACONDA
DILLON
HAMILTON
HELENA
GREAT FALLS

443
467
451
378
375
507
596

443
436
462
487
505
379
290

2-163D CAV BN UNITS
HHC(-) 2-163D CAV
DET 1 HHC
DET 2 HHC
CO A 2-163D CAV
CO B 2-163D CAV
CO C 2-163D CAV
CO D 2-163D CAV

KALISPELL
LIBBY
WHITEFISH
KALISPELL
MISSOULA
MISSOULA
SHELBY

465
540
479
465
350
350
673

438
527
432
438
458
458
279

1-163D IN BN UNITS
HHC 1-163D IN
CO A 1-163D IN
CO B(-) 1-163D IN
DET 1 CO B
CO C(-) 1-163D IN
DET 1 CO C
CO D(-) 1-163D IN
DET 1 CO D
CO E(AT) 1-163D IN

BILLINGS
BILLINGS
GLENDIVE
SIDNEY
CULBERTSON
PLENTYWOOD
LEWISTOWN
CHINOOK
MILES CITY

666
666
888

298
298
170
159

495TH SPT BN UNITS
HHC 495TH SPT
CO A(-) S&T SPT
DET 1 CO A
CO B(-) MAINT SPT
CO C(MED) SPT

HAVRE
MISSOULA
BILLINGS
HELENA
BILLINGS

937
970

164

678
730
811

222

709
350

177
458
298
379
298

666

507
666
73

122

1012

156
216

APPENDIX C
MONTANA TRAINING CENTER
ACREAGE OWNERSHIP/CONFIGURATION
TACTICAL MANEUVER AREA (Northern Sector)
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

354,640 ACRES (62%)

PRIVATE

132,340 ACRES (23%)

S T A T E ......................

78,880

VALLEY COUNTY AIRPORT ENTERPRISE.

.

TOTAL:

ACRES (14%)
6,800

ACRES (<1%)

572.660 ACRES

FIRE AND MANEUVER AREA (Southern Sector)
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

363,676 ACRES (89%)

PRIVATE ...........................

18,810 ACRES (4.6%)

STATE .............................

26,200 ACRES (6.4%)

TOTAL:

408.706 ACRES

NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SECTOR TOTALS
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

718,316 ACRES (73.7%)

PRIVATE ...........................

151,150 ACRES (15.5%)

STATE .............................

105,100 ACRES (10.7%)

VALLEY COUNTY AIRPORT ENTERPRISE.

.

TOTAL:

6,800

ACRES (<.01%)

981.366 ACRES

MAP COLOR KEY (APPENDIX C cont.)
YELLOW - ELM
PINK - OTHER FEDERAL LANDS(LAND UTILIZATION LANDS)
BLUE - STATE LANDS
WHITE - PRIVATE
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APPENDIX C (cont.)
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APPENDIX D
MONTANA NATIONAL GUARD EXPENDITURES BY COMMUNITY
(As of September 30, 1988)
CITY

OPERATING
EXPENSES

PAYROLL

ANACONDA
BILLINGS
BOZEMAN
BUTTE
CHINOOK
CULBERTSON
DEER LODGE
DILLON
GREAT FALLS
GLASGOW
GLENDIVE
HAMILTON
HARLOWTON
HAVRE
HELENA
KALISPELL
LEWISTOWN
LIBBY
LIVINGSTON
MALTA
MILES CITY
MISSOULA
PLENTYWOOD
SHELBY
SIDNEY
WHITEFISH

$

TOTALS

$43, 350, 400

180
1, 499
1/ 109
640
353
337
181
268
21, 114
269
208
255
132
986
11, 763
992
301
201
190
279
275
1, 045
209
183
199
169

900
200
800
800
500
600
300
800
600
600
600
900
200
300
400
700
400
600
500
500
500
300
600
100
500
200

$

32
168
121
46
32
43
26
35
336
37
35
37
26
74
749
111
42
29
30
41
46
154
28
33
27
24

200
200
600
500
500
400
000
900
200
000
300
400
800
900
600
100
200
400
800
600
400
600
500
700
300
200

S2.373 ,300
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TOTAL
$

213
1,667
1,231
687
386
381
207
304
21,450
306
243
293
159
1,061
12,513
1,103
343
231
221
321
321
1,199
238
216
226
193

100
400
400
300
000
000
300
700
800
600
900
300
000
200
000
800
600
000
300
100
900
900
100
800
800
400

S45.723 ,700

APPENDIX E
CONTRIBUTIONS OF ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS
TO THE
TOTAL ARMY
(As of Sept. 30, 1988)

UNIT TYPES

% OF TOTAL
ARMY: ARMY
NAT'L GUARD

INFANTRY SCOUT TROOPS

100

TOW LIGHT ANTI-TANK
INFANTRY BATTALIONS

100

HEAVY HELICOPTER UNITS

100

% OF TOTAL
ARMY: ARMY
RESERVE

PUBLIC AFFAIRS UNITS

58

29

HEAVY EQUIPMENT
MAINTENANCE COMPANIES

76

10

SEPARATE BRIGADES

73

7

ENGINEER BATTALIONS
(COMBAT)

52

25

8

69

ENGINEER BRIDGE COMPANY

43

31

TRUCK COMPANIES

37

30

MILITARY POLICE COMPANIES

44

21

FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

52

9

SIGNAL (COMMUNICATION)
BATTALIONS

43

14

INFANTRY BATTALIONS

50

5

SPECIAL FORCES GROUPS

25

25

ARMORED BATTALIONS

43

2

HOSPITAL UNITS

MT ARNG
UNITS

(in Wyoming)
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GLOSSARY
ACTIVATION: By issuance of an official order, a soldier
is placed on active duty.
ACTIVE COMPONENT: Comprised of all branches of the Armed
Forces who are on active duty, i.e., full-time.
ASSIGNED TROOP STRENGTH:
who are in a unit.

The actual quantity of soldiers

AUTHORIZED TROOP STRENGTH: The quantity of soldiers
identified by National Guard Bureau as appropriate for
a unit.
COLUMN FORMATION: Vehicles or personnel arranged one
after the other, a row.
COMBINED ARMS: The incorporation and integration of
various military resources during tactical operations.
DEPLOYMENT: The relocation of troops to overseas areas
of operations.
EMBARKATION: The loading of troops, supplies and equip
ment onto ships or aircraft for deployment to overseas
locations.
FEDERALIZATION, FEDERALIZED: The transfer of Reserve
Component units from reserve status to active duty
status. This action is accomplished by issuance of
an official order.
FIELD ENVIRONMENT:
maneuvers.

An area for military operations or

FORCE STRUCTURE: The organization of military units and
their relationship to each other.
LOGISTICS, LOGISTICAL: The procedures and actions of
procurement, maintenance and transportation of mili
tary material, facilities and personnel.
MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: The job, skill or
"slot” in the military a soldier possesses.
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GLOSSARY (cont.)
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU: The division of the Department
of Defense responsible for overall management of
United States National Guard functions.
Federal
funds and Department of Defense policy are channeled
through National Guard Bureau eventually to the state
level. However, National Guard Bureau is not in the
chain-of-command of National Guard organizations.
RESERVE COMPONENT: Comprised of National Guard and
Reserve units of all branches of the Armed Forces,
i.e.. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.
SCENARIO: An account or synopsis of a projected course
of action or events.
STRENGTH:

The number of soldiers assigned to a unit.

TACTICS/ TACTICAL: Relating to combat operations. The
process of disposing and maneuvering forces in combat
or simulated combat).
TOTAL FORCE: The combination and utilization of Active
and Reserve Component units in planning, policy and
execution.
WAR PLANS: Those plans made at the highest levels of the
Department of Defense which address specific threats to
national security and identify the military response.
The response, among other things, identifies specific
Active and Reserve Component units which will respond.
War plans carry security classifications of SECRET and
TOP SECRET.
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FOOTNOTES
^U.S., Department of the Army, Training Site General
Information. National Guard Bureau Pamphlet 25-1
(5 February 1988), p.p. 1 - 1 thru 6-98.
^Ibid.
^Montana, Montana Training Center (MTC) Site
Development Plan (20 November 1989), p. 1-5.
4
U.S., Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land
Management, Executive Correspondence. 1616.041 (1 December
1989).
^University of Montana Bureau of Business and
Economic Research, "Growth Expected for Montana's
Economy," Montana Business Ouarterlv 27 (Autumn 1989):19.
^Montana Taxpayer Association, "Attracting New,
Keeping Old Business Hinges on Adjusting our Tax Policy,"
Montana Taxpaver XXIII (November 1989):1-4.
^"Montana's Cupboard is Bare", Ibid. p.2.
®"Attracting New, Keeping Old Business Hinges on
Adjusting our Tax Policy", op. cit., p.1.
^Ibid., p.2.
Montana, Montana Countv Profiles Suppliment to the
Fifth Edition - Valiev Countv (May 1989), sec. 06.
^^U.5., Bureau of Census, Local Population Estimates
f1988 PopulationK (1990).
Montana, The Impact of the Montana National Guard
(29 December 1988), p.p. 14-43.
Ibid. p.25.
Interview with Captain Dinan, Budget Officer at the
National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Californea, 16
January 1990.
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FOOTNOTES (cont.)
Interview with Captain Russell, Project Officer for
the Montana Training Center, Helena, Montana, 24 January
1990.
Interview with Sergeant First Class Wing, Pay
Examinations Supervisor - United States Property and
Fiscal Office, Fort Harrison, Montana, 25 January 1990.
17

Montana, Montana Training Center fMTCl Site
Development Plan (20 November 1989), encl. 6-5.
Ibid., encl. 6-6.
Ibid., "Footnotes".
20

Robert D. Lee, Jr. and Ronald W. Johnson, Public
Budgeting Systems 3d ed. (Baltimore: University Park
Press, 1984), p.p. 25-26.
21

"Army Plans to cut 2 00,000 Personnel," Helena
Independent Record. 21 November 1989, sec. A, p. 8.
^^U.S., Department of the Army, Training Site General
Information. National Guard Bureau Pamphlet 25-1
(5 February 1988), p.p. 1-1 thru 6-98.
^^"Contributions by Army Reserve Components to the
Total Army", Defense *89 Almanic (Sep/Oct 1989):16-17.
"Study: Nevada's Rangelands are Dying," Reno
Gazette-Journal. 16 November 1989, sec. B, p.p. 1-2.
^^CPT Russell, op. cit.

81

BIBLIOGRAPHY
U.S. Department of the Army. Training Site General
Information Summary. National Guard Bureau
Pamphlet 25-1 (1988).
Montana. Montana Training Center (MTC^ Site Development
Plan (1989).
Montana. Montana Countv Profiles - Valiev Countv 5th ed
(1985).
Montana. Montana Countv Profiles Supplement to the Fifth
Edition - Valiev County (1989).
U.S. Department of the Interior. Bureau of Land
Management, Executive Correspondence. 1616.041
(December 1989).
University of Montana Bureau of Business and Economic
Research. "Growth Expected for Montana's Economy."
Montana Business Ouarterlv 27 (Autumn 1989):19.
Montana Taxpayer Association. "Attracting New, Keeping
Old Business Hinges on Adjusting our tax policy."
Montana Taxoaver XXIII (November 1989): 1-4.
Lee, Robert D., Jr., and Johnson, Ronald. Public
Budgeting Svstems 3d ed. Baltimore: University
Park Press, 1984.
Montana. The Impact of the Montana National Guard
(December 1988).
"Contributions by Army Reserve Components to the Total
Army." Defense *89 Almana (Sep/Oct 1989):16-17.
"Army Plans to cut 200,000 Personnel." Helena
Independent Record. 21 November 1989, sec. A,
p. 8.
"Study: Nevada's Rangelands are Dying." Reno GazetteJournal . 16 November 1989, sec. B, p.p. 1-2.
Dinan, Captain. Budget Officer at the National Training
Center, Fort Irwin, Californea. Interview, 16
January 1990.

82

BIBLIOGRAPHY (cont.)
Russell, Captain. Project Officer for the Montana
Training Center. Helena, Montana. Interview, 24
January 1990.
Wing, Sergeant First Class. Pay Examinations Supervisor
- United States Property and Fiscal Office. Fort
Harrison, Montana. Interview, 24 January 1990.

83

